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1107 
Franz Kafka’s “Before the Law”: 
A Parable 
 
Geoffrey L. Brackett* 
 
“[D]elivering of knowledge in distinct and dis-
joyned Aphorismes doth leave the wit of man 
more free to turne and tosse, and make use of that 
which is so delivered to more severall purposes 
and applications; for wee see that all the ancient 
wisdom and science was wont to be delivered in 
that forme, as may be seen by the parables of 
Solomon, and by the Aphorismes of Hippocrates, 
and the morall verses of Theogenes and 
Phocilides. . .” 
Sir Francis Bacon (1636)1 
 
Despite Francis Bacon’s cautionary note, I have always 
been a fan of parables, and perhaps the most poignant one to 
speak for perils of the legal profession is Franz Kafka’s “Vor 
dem Gesetz” (“Before the Law”), one of the relatively few works 
to be published in his lifetime.  It was seen first in the almanac 
Vom Jüngsten Tag: Ein Almanach Neuer Dichtung in 
December 1915 before it was included in his novel Der Prozess 
(The Trial), which was unpublished in his lifetime.  He wrote it 
at one sitting on December 13, 1914,2 and in fewer than 650 
words, Kafka illustrates the menace of the law to those for 
whom it is a mystery and the indifferent cruelty possible from 
 
* Geoffrey L. Brackett is currently Executive Vice President of Marist College, 
a post he entered in August, 2010.  Prior to that, he served as a faculty 
member and administrator at Pace University for twenty years, most 
recently as Provost and Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs. 
1. FRANCIS BACON, THE ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND B3 
(Lawbook Exch. ed., 2003) (1630), available at 
https://archive.org/stream/elementsofcommon00baco#page/n19/mode/2up. 
2. See Patrick J. Glen, The Deconstruction and Reification of Law in 
Franz Kafka’s “Before the Law” and the Trial, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 23, 
33 (2007). 
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those who have access to it.  He does this while subtly 
referencing, through metaphor, the social, political, and 
educational barriers that have always separated those who 
have access to the law and those whose ignorance of it can cost 
them everything.  And he does it with a sheen of absurdist 
humor that reflects the existentialist artistic response against 
the alienation of the modern world that was unfolding around 
him. 
Kafka’s brief narrative opens a world of interpretive 
possibility, the kind of which Bacon argued against as a model 
of jurisprudential doctrine in the seventeenth century.  In 
twentieth century post-structuralist theory, the text was so 
attractive that Jacques Derrida could not resist highlighting it 
as a living illustration of différance.  Derrida was drawn to 
examine the complicated, refracted “relationship taken up in 
the parable between title and text, door and law, doorkeeper 
and man from the country, and by allegorical extension, text 
and reader, text and writer.”3  The power of Kafka’s text makes 
it seem simultaneously like a Medieval folk tale that could 
have been appropriated by Chaucer as well as a movie script 
for a chilling twentieth-century noir film starring Orson Welles 
(in fact, The Trial was made into a film in 1962 directed by 
Orson Welles and starred Anthony Perkins—with a haunting 
reading of the parable included in the film).  In case you are not 
familiar, a quick refresher on this work: 
 
BEFORE THE LAW stands a doorkeeper. To this 
doorkeeper there comes a man from the country 
and prays for admittance to the Law. But the 
doorkeeper says that he cannot grant admittance 
at the moment. The man thinks it over and then 
asks if he will be allowed in later. “It is possible,” 
says the doorkeeper, “but not at the moment.” 
Since the gate stands open, as usual, and the 
doorkeeper steps to one side, the man stoops to 
peer through the gateway into the interior. 
Observing that, the doorkeeper laughs and says: 
 
3. Raphael Foshay, Derrida on Kafka’s “Before the Law”, 63 ROCKY MTN. 
REV. 194, 199 (2009). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss4/1
  
2015 FRANZ KAFKA’S “BEFORE THE LAW” 1109 
“If you are so drawn to it, just try to go in despite 
my veto. But take note: I am powerful. And I am 
only the least of the doorkeepers. From hall to 
hall there is one doorkeeper after another, each 
more powerful than the last. The third 
doorkeeper is already so terrible that even I 
cannot bear to look at him.” These are difficulties 
the man from the country has not expected; the 
Law, he thinks, should surely be accessible at all 
times and to everyone, but as he now takes a 
closer look at the doorkeeper in his fur coat, with 
his big sharp nose and long, thin, black Tartar 
beard, he decides that it is better to wait until he 
gets permission to enter. The doorkeeper gives 
him a stool and lets him sit down at one side of 
the door. There he sits for days and years. He 
makes many attempts to be admitted, and 
wearies the doorkeeper by his importunity. The 
doorkeeper frequently has little interviews with 
him, asking him questions about his home and 
many other things, but the questions are put 
indifferently, as great lords put them, and 
always finish with the statement that he cannot 
be let in yet. The man, who has furnished himself 
with many things for his journey, sacrifices all he 
has, however valuable, to bribe the doorkeeper. 
The doorkeeper accepts everything, but always 
with the remark: “I am only taking it to keep you 
from thinking you have omitted anything.” 
During these many years the man fixes his 
attention almost continuously on the doorkeeper. 
He forgets the other doorkeepers, and this first 
one seems to him the sole obstacle preventing 
access to the Law. He curses his bad luck, in his 
early years boldly and loudly, later, as he grows 
old, he only grumbles to himself. He becomes 
childish, and since in his yearlong contemplation 
of the doorkeeper he has come to know even the 
fleas in his fur collar, he begs the fleas as well to 
help him and to change the doorkeeper’s mind. 
At length his eyesight begins to fail, and he does 
3
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not know whether the world is really darker or 
whether his eyes are only deceiving him. Yet in 
his darkness he is now aware of a radiance that 
streams inextinguishably from the gateway of 
the Law. Now he has not very long to live. Before 
he dies, all his experiences in these long years 
gather themselves in his head to one point, a 
question he has not yet asked the doorkeeper. He 
waves him nearer, since he can no longer raise 
his stiffening body. The doorkeeper has to bend 
low towards him, for the difference in height 
between them has altered much to the man’s 
disadvantage. “What do you want to know now?” 
asks the doorkeeper; “you are insatiable.” 
“Everyone strives to reach the Law,” says the 
man, “so how does it happen that for all these 
many years no one but myself has ever begged 
for admittance?” The doorkeeper recognizes that 
the man has reached his end, and to let his 
failing senses catch the words roars in his ear: 
“No one else could ever be admitted here, since 
this gate was made only for you. I am now going 
to shut it.”4 
 
For my money, this is a tour de force.  Creatively, I think it 
ranks with works of brilliant brevity such as Lincoln’s 
Gettysburg Address, Shakespeare’s 18th Sonnet, and Emily 
Dickinson’s “I Heard a Fly Buzz When I Died.”  The haunting 
architecture of our human relationship with the law is laid 
bare here, and the complexity of that relationship is both 
inviting and discouraging. 
 
I. Difficulties Not Expected 
 
Clarity of purpose and lack of access have always plagued 
the legal profession.  The dominant theme of Kafka’s 
unfinished novel into which this parable ultimately fits is the 
 
4. FRANZ KAFKA, THE COMPLETE STORIES 22-23 (Nahum Glatzer ed., 
Willa Muir et al. trans.,1971). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss4/1
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intractable difficulty of the law.  The Trial uses this parable as 
a talisman for the larger mystery enveloping Josef K. after he 
awakens to find that he has fallen afoul of the law for some 
unknown and possibly unknowable reason.  “Before the Law” 
appears at a point in the novel when K. is deeply involved in 
the intricacies of his case, but appears to be on an errand that 
has nothing to do with it.  The bank where K. works asks him 
to meet an Italian client.  K. arranges to meet him at a 
cathedral, and the client never shows up.  At the cathedral, a 
place seemingly as far removed from his legal case as one could 
imagine, K. has the parable repeated back to him by a priest.  
The priest turns out to be an employee of the courts—the 
prison chaplain, he claims—and tells K. that the parable is 
among the most ancient of its texts.  After an exegesis several 
pages longer than the original parable, the priest underlines 
the ineffability of the text’s message.  He concludes “One need 
not consider everything true; one must only consider it 
necessary.”  The necessity of the process—and the parable—
arises from its ancient, undiscoverable source.  It is precedent, 
or it is myth, or it is religion, or it is all three.  The source of 
the parable, its meaning, and its application are all mysterious 
to K.  The priest, whose religious function is subjugated to the 
secular mystery of the law, is of no help in understanding its 
meaning. 
Our modern relationship with the law is both maddeningly 
mundane and steeped in mystery.  From the administrative 
trivia associated with a simple parking ticket to the larger 
issues determined by our legal system that lay bare social ills 
(the Grand Jury decisions in Ferguson, Missouri and New York 
City late in 2014 are only the most recent examples), to the 
constitutionality of legislation as sweeping as the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, the law ascends in its 
hierarchy of decisions from the proper posting of a parking sign 
to the definition of a tax that can be levied on non-participants 
of a federal program for health care to the legal recognition of 
marriage rights regardless of gender.  For the majority of 
individuals in modern society—and in our country—the law is 
omnipresent, mysterious, and complex.  As President Obama 
indicated after the Ferguson verdict, we are “a Nation of 
Laws.”  The articulation of that phrase and its echoes of the 
5
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Founding Fathers was meant presumably to anchor the idea 
once again for the population most dissatisfied with the latest 
outcome of the process.  Emphasizing the long view, reminding 
people of the sustained arc of progress that is the result of 
American civil jurisprudence, is a tough sell against the 
immediacy of the moment.5  Kafka would have understood this 
dilemma and known that any pronouncement of the 
hagiography of the law and its systems would have rung hollow 
to people who do not believe it has relevance to them. 
In a private musing in his notebook, unpublished during 
his lifetime (and only escaping loss because his friend Max 
Brod disobeyed his orders to burn his manuscripts6), Kafka 
attempts to work out the power and the relevance of the law.  
In a section entitled “The Problem with Our Laws,” he writes: 
“Our laws are not generally known; they are kept secret by the 
small group of nobles who rule us. We are convinced that these 
ancient laws are scrupulously administered; nevertheless, it is 
an extremely painful thing to be ruled by laws that one does 
not know.”7  Moreover, the existence of these laws is called into 
question because of the ancient nature of their sources: 
 
The very existence of these laws, however, is at 
most a matter of presumption.  There is a 
tradition that they exist and that they are a 
mystery confided to the nobility, but it is not and 
cannot be more than a mere tradition sanctioned 
by age, for the essence of a secret code is that it 
should remain a mystery. Some of us among the 
people have attentively scrutinized the doings of 
the nobility since the earliest times and possess 
records made by our forefathers—records which 
we have conscientiously continued—and claim to 
recognize amid the countless number of facts 
 
5. Michael Eric Dyson points out that “President Obama said that our 
nation was built on the rule of law.  That is true, but incomplete.  His life, 
and his career, too, are the product of broken laws.”  Michael Eric Dyson, Op-
Ed., Where Do We Go After Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2014, at SR1. 
6. It is worth noting that the ownership of the manuscripts have 
themselves been the subject of over fifty years’ worth of legal dispute.  See 
Elif Batuman, Kafka’s Last Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2010, at MM34. 
7. KAFKA, supra note 4, at 482. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss4/1
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certain main tendencies which permit of this or 
that historical formulation; but when in 
accordance with these scrupulously tested and 
logically ordered conclusions we seek to adjust 
ourselves somewhat for the present or the future, 
everything becomes uncertain, and our work 
seems only an intellectual game, for perhaps 
these laws that we are trying to unravel do not 
exist at all.8 
 
For Kafka, the logical application of precedence and tradition 
dissolves into an “intellectual game” because of uncertainty so 
severe that the very existence of the law is put to question.  
And yet, both K. from The Trial and the Man from the Country 
in “Before the Law” illustrate persistence above all else, and I 
think that is part of the draw of Kafka’s work.  Despite 
innumerable “difficulties not expected,” K. presses on with 
determination to understand the case against him.  There is 
something simultaneously brutal and hopeful about this 
persistence.  Its brutality is emphasized by Kafka in both the 
story, where the Man from the Country’s failing ears only just 
catch the final pronouncement of the Doorkeeper, and in The 
Trial by the ignominious end (“Like a Dog!”) for K.  The 
inexorable tension between the protagonist and the system is 
at the heart of the conflict, and while the cynic reads Kafka’s 
plot as the accurate barometer of the relationship because the 
protagonist is crushed, the optimist will say these figures—or 
those who follow them—will eventually win by improving the 
world.  Questioning the law, after all, is how it is remade.  The 
key word here is “eventually.” 
 
II.  Days and Years 
 
The dominant literary trope of the law is delay.  Kafka 
knew this intellectually, having received his Doctor of Law 
degree in 1906 from Karl-Ferdinand University in Prague.  He 
also knew this from practical experience, having worked at an 
insurance company and a quasi-governmental entity managing 
 
8. Id. at 482. 
7
  
1114 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:4 
insurance claims.9  In Kafka’s works I am referencing here, the 
Man from the Country and K. are both outlasted by the law, a 
theme central to both works.  Kafka knew this was a literary 
trope, of course.  In Hamlet, the only work of Shakespeare’s his 
diaries critique,10 the Prince’s most famous soliloquy argues for 
“self-slaughter” with the following: 
 
For who would bear the whips and scorns of 
time, 
Th’ oppressor’s wrong, the proud man’s 
contumely, 
The pangs of despised love, the law’s delay, 
The insolence of office, and the spurns 
That patient merit of th’ unworthy takes, 
When he himself might his quietus make 
With a bare bodkin? 
 (I,3:71-77)11 
 
Kafka also found solace in the English novelist Charles 
Dickens even while he criticized a certain “heartlessness to his 
sentimentally overflowing style.”12  The law’s delay is famously 
the main metaphor for Dickens’ Bleak House, which opens with 
the description of the London fog more a manifestation of 
Chancery courts than the regional atmosphere: 
 
Fog everywhere. Fog up the river, where it flows 
among green aits and meadows; fog down the 
river, where it rolls defiled among the tiers of 
shipping and the waterside pollutions of a great 
(and dirty) city. Fog on the Essex marshes, fog on 
the Kentish heights. Fog creeping into the 
 
9. Glen, supra note 2, at 8-9. 
10. See FRANZ KAFKA, DIARIES: 1910-1923 343 (Max Brod ed., Schocken 
Books, 1988).  On September 29, 1915, he writes “How could Fortinbras say 
that Hamlet had prov’d most royally?”  Id. at 200.  On the 3rd of April, 1912 
he writes of having “brought my sister home from Hamlet.”  Id. 
11. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF HAMLET  act 3, sc. 1. 
12. See KAFKA, supra note 10, at 388 (October 8, 1917 entry).  For 
Kafka’s Amerika as a “retort to Dickens,” see NEIL CORNWELL, THE ABSURD IN 
LITERATURE 197 (2006). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss4/1
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cabooses of collier-brigs; fog lying out on the 
yards, and hovering in the rigging of great ships; 
fog drooping on the gunwales of barges and small 
boats. Fog in the eyes and throats of ancient 
Greenwich pensioners, wheezing by the firesides 
of their wards; fog in the stem and bowl of the 
afternoon pipe of the wrathful skipper, down in 
his close cabin; fog cruelly pinching the toes and 
fingers of his shivering little ‘prentice boy on 
deck. Chance people on the bridges peeping over 
the parapets into a nether sky of fog, with fog all 
round them, as if they were up in a balloon, and 
hanging in the misty clouds.13 
 
“At the very heart of the fog,” Dickens continues, “sits the Lord 
High Chancellor in his High Court of Chancery.”14 
The common theme is the inaccessibility of the law from 
the common man: in Shakespeare it is the delay in its 
effectiveness (and perhaps insolence in administration); in 
Dickens its access is managed by the educated elite for the 
purposes of their own enrichment; in Kafka, it appears as the 
mechanism of the faceless bureaucracy whose motives are not 
known.  In all cases, the law is a force that is relentless and 
without benefit to the vast majority of the populace. 
Kafka also shares a sense of humor about the law with 
Shakespeare and Dickens.  But where Shakespeare’s is 
character-specific (think of Falstaff’s disregard for the regimen 
of the law or Henry V’s enforcement of it) and Dickens applies 
his with a moral weight of thematic purpose (where the 
Chancery lawyers are the carbuncles of the system of 
bureaucratic oppression), Kafka’s humor anchors his work in 
the realm of the absurd.  The very phrase describing the Man 
from the Country’s wait—”There he sits for days and years” 
(my emphasis)—pairs a coordinating conjunction and 
contradiction that makes the parable possible by linking the 
mundane with the miraculous.  A few moments in time become 
 
13. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 11 (Norman Page ed., Penguin 
Books 1971) (1853). 
14. Id. at 12. 
9
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a lifetime, and a story becomes a parable.  For Kafka to do it in 
a single line with a perfectly even tone—the assertion of the 
impossible as normal—presages the Absurdist movement.15  
And yet the work has its roots firmly set in the end of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, evidenced by the formality of the 
guard and his Tartar beard and fur collar, among other details.  
Kafka reaches backwards and forwards with seeming 
effortlessness, a point David Foster Wallace has highlighted as 
the discrete sensibility of his humor: 
 
What Kafka’s stories have, rather, is a grotesque, 
gorgeous, and thoroughly modern complexity, an 
ambivalence that becomes the multivalent Both/ 
And logic of the, quote, “unconscious,” which I 
personally think is just a fancy word for soul. 
Kafka’s humor— not only not neurotic but anti-
neurotic, heroically sane— is, finally, a religious 
humor, but religious in the manner of 
Kierkegaard and Rilke and the Psalms, a 
harrowing spirituality against which even Ms. 
[Flannery] O’Connor’s bloody grace seems a little 
bit easy, the souls at stake pre-made.16 
 
Kafka’s “religious” humor in the parable and its ageless 
modernity is underlined by its possible Talmudic roots, “found 
in a traditional Jewish Midrash-legend on Moses who, on his 
way to Sinai, had to overcome four Angels/Gate-keepers to get 
access to the Torah.”17  And Kafka’s connection of the mythical 
roots of our anxiety with the modern world—where spiritual 
quests are transformed into menial servitude and holy 
knowledge is replaced with endless bureaucratic operations—
highlights a dilemma of interpretation.  Are the religious 
paradigms corrupted by modernity?  Or does modernity reveal 
 
15. For Kafka as a precursor to the wider international Absurdist 
Movement, see CORNWELL, supra note 12, at 184-214. 
16. DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, CONSIDER THE LOBSTER: AND OTHER ESSAYS 
(2005). 
17. Dražen Pehar, Herodotus, Kafka before the Law, and Ambiguity as 
an Engine of Narrative Plot, ACADEMIA.EDU, 
https://www.academia.edu/2008999/Herodotus_Kafka_before_the_Law_and_a
mbiguity_as_an_engine_of_narrative_plot (last visited May 5, 2015). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss4/1
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them as empty manipulative functions by stripping them of 
myth?  The similarity of circumstance between the ancient and 
the modern, the secular and the religious, the bureaucrat and 
the priest—where one would expect vast difference—is where 
Kafka’s dark ironic humor lies. 
 
III.  Radiance That Streams Inextinguishably 
 
And yet, when the laughs die down, there is an emptiness 
that yawns, and a fear that this world view may lead to 
nothing but a cold grave.  If the rituals have been corrupted, or 
simply recognized as insipid, what are the implications for the 
role of rite or the function of the parable’s form? For Kafka, the 
form of the parable was unstable, and yet, it was this very 
characteristic that made it dynamic and so suitable for the 
complexities of his mind.  In his notebooks he penned a brief 
section “On Parables” in which he laid out the conundrum of 
parables with a precise logical clarity: 
 
MANY complain that the words of the wise are 
always merely parables and of no use in daily 
life, which is the only life we have. When the 
sage says: “Go over,” he does not mean that we 
should cross to some actual place, which we could 
do anyhow if the labor were worth it; he means 
some fabulous yonder, something unknown to us, 
something that he cannot designate more 
precisely either, and therefore cannot help us 
here in the very least. All these parables really 
set out to say merely that the incomprehensible 
is incomprehensible, and we know that already. 
But the cares we have to struggle with every day: 
that is a different matter.18 
 
He then continues the passage, which devolves into chaotic 
subjective conversation that blurs the line between reality and 
parable, notebook observation and fictional dramatic narrative.  
It is as if the theoretical idea behind the parable deconstructs 
 
18. KAFKA, supra note 4, at 506. 
11
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into an argument in his head: 
 
Concerning this a man once said: Why such 
reluctance? If you only followed the parables you 
yourselves would become parables and with that 
rid of all your daily cares. 
Another said: I bet that is also a parable. 
The first said: You have won. 
The second said: But unfortunately only in 
parable. 
The first said: No, in reality: in parable you have 
lost.19 
 
This quick leap from reason to imagination—or logical order to 
chaos—is typical of Kafka’s style throughout his canon.  This is 
a repetition of what might be called his own “intellectual 
game.”  For Kafka, who did not subscribe to religious faith and 
also eschewed political theory, there was something endlessly 
compelling about the interrogative, the nature of query and 
response, the drive to get at the source of the matter.  Max 
Brod describes the dynamic he saw at play in Kafka’s mind as 
conscientia scrupulosa—“unimaginably precise 
conscientiousness”: 
 
It revealed itself in all questions of a moral 
nature, where he could never overlook the 
slightest shadow of any injustice that occurred.  
From the very beginning one is reminded of the 
debates in the Talmud; this method of reasoning 
was foreshadowed there too; at the same time, he 
didn’t get to know the Talmud itself until much 
later on in life.  Many of his works exhibit this 
trait, for example . . . the great scene in The 
Trial, in which the legend “Before the Law” is 
discussed from various angles.20 
 
As a student, Kafka tried alternative courses of study, 
 
19. KAFKA, supra note 4, at 506. 
20. KAFKA, supra note 10, at 47. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss4/1
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including chemistry, philosophy, literature and philology, all to 
no avail.  Eventually he came to the realization that a course of 
study in law was what he needed to pursue because it would 
provide him the means to support himself.21  His favorite 
courses had been literature, but law or medicine were the only 
career options and law was, despite its drudgery, the better 
alternative.  However, any potential intellectual solace in its 
investigation was stymied by his circumstances, which limited 
his options of study to Karl-Ferdinand University in Prague.  
As Ernst Pavel points out, as an institution of legal instruction 
Karl-Ferdinand “seems to have fallen considerably short of 
even the far from exalted standards prevailing in the more 
prestigious institutions of the empire” by being “shaped by its 
function”: 
 
The purpose of this German law school, 
operating in an alien and increasingly hostile 
environment, was to turn out cadres of 
bureaucrats equipped to enforce centralized 
power in peripheral outposts of the empire. And 
in this task, which imposed no great strain on 
mediocre minds, it appears to have been 
reasonably successful.22 
 
While the natural elements of what Brod identified as Kafka’s 
“Talmudic mind” might have appreciated the law as an 
“intellectual game,” his personal circumstances would not allow 
it.  Biographers have illustrated that Kafka was exposed to the 
variety of social, political, and philosophical theories the early 
twentieth century provided, and as a marginalized Czech in the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire and a Jew in a Europe hurtling 
toward its worst manifestation of anti-Semitism, he knew the 
challenges that were brewing.  He was, however, steadfast in 
his refusal to align with any of the main anodynes his friends 
and colleagues were espousing, from Psychoanalysis to Zionism 
to Socialism: 
 
21. Glen, supra note 2, at 27-8. 
22. ERNST PAWEL, THE NIGHTMARE OF REASON: A LIFE OF FRANZ KAFKA 
118 (1992). 
13
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Abstract ideas, whether in philosophy, politics, or 
religion, were at best of marginal and passing 
interest to him. He was never a systematic 
thinker; the very notion of a closed system, in 
fact, must have seemed repellent. Neither formal 
logic nor synthetic dogma offered any meaningful 
clues to the mysteries of the universe that 
preoccupied him, and he had yet to discover his 
own proper way of dealing with them. In the 
meantime, he avidly fished in the main currents 
of nineteenth-century thought and used 
whatever seemed helpful to the precariously 
emerging self. Yet the very skepticism which 
rendered him receptive to these ideas— and was 
reinforced by them in turn— also inevitably led 
him to question their validity and reject them in 
short order.23 
 
In a perfect world, one might posit that a secular approach for 
managing conflict based on precedent—a system of law, in 
other words—might have been the best solution for an 
intellectual of Kafka’s disposition.  Neither religious nor 
political, it might have been the natural answer for him.  The 
central primacy of the law in his work, I think, speaks to his 
attraction to this ideal.  The law’s placement as an entity under 
which all operate underscores its ability to cut across the socio-
economic, religious, and political landscape that is always in 
flux, and which was dramatically in flux in Kafka’s own time.  
That the system under which all are supposed to be equal is re-
imagined into a phantasmagorical nightmare of bureaucracy 
where all are equally oppressed is a critical element of what 
makes Kafka’s work so powerful.  No nightmare is more 
haunting than the one that corrupts the potential ideal. 
 
IV. Made Only For You 
 
In August of 1989, I got a call from my father, who told me 
that he was enrolling in law school at Chicago Kent School of 
 
23. Id. at 70. 
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Law.  He was doing this because he lost a bet with my Uncle 
Robert, who challenged my father to take the LSAT cold and 
apply.  The deal struck was that if accepted, he had to go; if 
rejected, he was free to continue his life without the degree.  If 
you knew anything about my uncle, you would know he was 
born to litigate, and a law degree was the natural end-point for 
a career that had started in the boxing ring, included a 
midnight enlistment in the Army, a stint in dental school and a 
successful career as a periodontist—all of which led up to his 
eventual discovery of a career where logic replaced brawn and 
he could choose the fights he would undertake rather than 
fight to defend the work he had already done.  My father, on 
the other hand, is someone who endured law school to honor 
his bet (a blood-honor at that), but considers it a high 
distinction to have his sheepskin unsullied by any actual 
practice of law.  Back when he entered into this arrangement, 
which he announced by phone from Chicago to me in my New 
York City apartment, I knew this would be the case.  The first 
thing I did was pull an edition of Kafka off the shelf and read to 
him “Before the Law.”  By the time I finished we were both 
laughing hysterically, and I remember trying to read the last 
words of the Doorkeeper through the tears rolling out of my 
eyes.  And then, after a few moments, we fell quiet, said our 
goodbyes and good lucks, and hung up.  I couldn’t have 
articulated it at the time, but I think Kafka’s parable laid out 
for us the power of the law as an ideal, its reverential place in 
society, and the humility and dedication needed to approach its 
study.  In other words, we both knew my father was leaving the 
country to go see the Doorkeeper. 
Since that phone call my father has completed his degree 
and my Uncle Robert has passed away after a brief but 
successful career as a barrister.  My own career has taken me 
from the classroom into various administrative offices, 
including one as Provost and Executive Vice President of Pace 
University, where I oversaw the Law School, chaired the 
Dean’s search committee that brought Michelle Simon into the 
position, and worked on various initiatives to engage the 
University with the leadership that the Law School provided on 
issues such as sustainability, professional education, and land 
use, among others.  I moved on to Marist College in 2010, but 
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the experience of engaging with Michelle and the Law School 
community has stayed with me. 
And as I have thought about that experience—and Kafka, 
and the crazy iterations of the law in our world—I have grown 
to appreciate the significance of an individual’s or an 
institution’s persistence in striving to ensure the world 
maintains a semblance of balance about the law so that we do 
not end up like the Man from the Country or Josef K., outside 
of the operations of the law and without meaningful 
engagement and understanding of it.  The foundation of the 
law—especially the ideal of equal treatment under the law—is 
exactly what makes legal education so critical to the health of 
society.  Understanding the singular relationship each 
individual has with the law is at the heart of civil rights, 
criminal and even environmental law.  That each individual 
case builds precedent for future law, the signature of our 
common law system, is uniquely powerful.  It is at the heart of 
a healthy legal system and, arguably, society. 
The understanding of these principles, equal treatment 
under law and legal precedent, is what great teachers of law 
endeavor to provide, and great institutions.  Personally, I think 
Franz Kafka inherently understood these but could never 
accept them as beneficial.  It may be that he never would have 
accepted them, even if his circumstances had allowed it.  
However, I can’t help but imagine that more latitude to explore 
the “intellectual game” that fascinated him as a theme and a 
central plot device—and of course a more receptive and 
innovative university in which to study the law—might have 
altered the course of his thinking.  I don’t think anyone would 
trade Kafka’s artistic output in return for that possibility, but 
it is an intriguing one to contemplate. 
The point of this rumination is that Kafka’s struggles are a 
clear example of how the law is at the center of our 
understanding of self and other, a principle illustrated from the 
lessons of the Talmud to the latest Supreme Court docket.  It 
defines our history—our relations with the “nobles” out of 
whose machinations it arose—as well as our future, crafted by 
those whose attraction to its “intellectual game” and whose 
individual persistence will allow them to shape it for those who 
come after.  It is for these reasons that, in thinking about what 
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I might explore in honor of Michelle Simon, Franz Kafka’s 
parable “Before the Law” came to mind.  While it is true that 
she, as any administrator, has found herself in the midst of 
Kafkaesque scenarios that have befuddled her, and it is true, 
especially from a faculty member’s perspective, that she has 
appeared to be in the center of arranging such scenarios,24 the 
fact of the matter is that her leadership as Dean and dedication 
to the mission of Pace University School of Law to achieve a 
more just society has helped illuminate the law and increase 
access to it for tens of thousands of its students, alumni, and 
probably millions of their clients.  This volume is rife with 
examples of what Michelle Simon has done for that purpose, 
and especially what Pace Law School has accomplished with 
Michelle as a colleague and at the helm.  Many of us know 
what her leadership as a scholar, teacher, administrator, and 
as a woman has done for Pace, the region, and the legal 
profession.  What this essay hopes to achieve is to accent the 
celebration of that accomplishment with the recognition that 
her work is connected to and contributing to the great 
conversation we have been having about the law since we first 
started speaking in parables. 
 
24. This is, of course, inescapable as an administrator.  Evidentiary 
sources are too numerous to cite. 
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